Why the American Public is Less Polarized on Foreign Policy

It is no secret that American social and political life has become a house divided. Over the past several decades, Americans have gravitated increasingly toward politically like-minded clusters. Political ideology now plays a large role in determining the neighborhoods where we live, the friends and family with whom we spend our time, and the news media that we consume. This divisive trend is not limited to the American public, but also characterizes relations between political elites and has contributed to gridlock in congress. The United States has become divided between two camps of increasingly extreme positions, a phenomenon known as polarization. 

While public opinion has become increasingly polarized on domestic policy, foreign policy has not been susceptible to the same degree. Though foreign policy divisions are growing among political elites, they have not yet trickled down to the general population. The underlying logic is that party elites do not transmit sufficiently clear cues to the public, who in turn, do not effectively interpret these cues. In simpler terms, elites have failed to effectively distinguish Republican foreign policy from Democrat foreign policy. What explains this communication failure?

1) Foreign policy is not a salient issue for voters

Foreign policy issues can be complex, esoteric, and exert little impact on the day-to-day lives of Americans. While the public is directly impacted by decisions on taxes and healthcare, the average citizen does not typically spend their time considering maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Thus, only a small percentage of the population should be expected to hold firm ideological preferences, while most can be expected to express opinions that are wavering and malleable. Political elites understand foreign policy issues are not salient for most voters and will not be high priorities on election day. Consequently, party elites face an opportunity cost carving out a niche on arcane issues of foreign policy, when they could instead be allocating precious resources towards concerns that serve the more immediate interests of the electorate. This contributes to a self-reinforcing cycle where the public does not perceive issues of foreign policy to be relevant because party elites are reluctant to devote time to explaining their significance, which provides less incentive for partisan elites to politicize these issues given that they are not salient for voters. The result is that foreign policy issues remain a low priority on the political agenda, and the public is less aware of where parties stand. 

2) Foreign policy crises evolve quickly and do not conform to stable binaries 

Where domestic political issues such as gun control, immigration, and abortion lend themselves to stable binary partisan preferences, foreign policy crises tend to display unique characteristics and evolve quickly. In such cases, the public has limited time to interpret partisan cues. Arguably the closest issue to conform to a binary is war, where Republicans tend to be more hawkish and Democrats tend to be more dovish. However, even in war the partisan distinction is not clear-cut. For the War in Afghanistan, all members of the Senate and House apart from a single Democrat, Barbara Lee, voted in favor of the use of force. For the War in Iraq, 81 House Democrats and 29 Senate Democrats still voted to authorize the use of force. Democratic presidents including Clinton, Obama, and Biden have been supportive of extra-congressional measures such as missile strikes, drone strikes, and special operations missions. In other words, it is difficult to signal stable partisan positions where such clear divisions hardly exist.

3) Foreign policy information can be restricted from the public domain

In some instances, Republican and Democratic elites do not sufficiently distinguish foreign policy positions because they cannot discuss certain issues in the public domain, much less politicize them. A great many foreign policy decisions take place behind closed doors at one of the various bureaucratic institutions of the US security apparatus. Under the banner of “national security” certain operations and details are marked as classified and withheld from public scrutiny. Even if this information is eventually disclosed, it may be redacted and heavily curated so that important details are withheld. To the extent that political elites themselves are privy to this proprietary knowledge, their ability to speak openly is heavily restricted. It is difficult to convey to the public distinct partisan positions in situations where elites are either uninformed or legally bound not to talk about a classified issue.

4) Foreign policy is rooted in the philosophy that “politics stop at the water’s edge” 

The maxim that “politics stop at the water’s edge” has served as a guiding principle of American foreign policy since the end of World War II. There is a practical element, given that the United States may be perceived as weak or vulnerable to attack if there is a demonstrable split in its foreign policy decision-making capabilities. Therefore, elites must be cautious about how their words will be interpreted by audiences outside of the United States. This may exert a tempering influence on partisan rhetoric, making distinct party positions less decipherable to the public. This idea is embedded in Wildavsky’s two presidencies thesis which may help explain the rally ‘round the flag effect. Given the foreign policy tradition that the president should be endowed with a degree of goodwill in times of crisis, partisan elites may refrain from politicizing urgent foreign policy events.  

Ultimately, the relative lack of polarization among the American public on foreign policy leaves room for optimism. During a time of great division, identifying areas of commonality and mutual interest is essential to closing the expansive fissure between red and blue. Foreign policy can play a major role in bridging the divide and bringing back a sense of unity. To a certain extent, we have witnessed this development since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, we must remain cautious. Reversing the trend of political polarization will not be easy, but we must start somewhere.      Leading by example, political elites should continue to embrace greater partisan solidarity in foreign policy and transmit this message openly to the public. Doing so may be the first step in traversing America’s deep ideological fault lines.

The views expressed here are solely those of the author.