North Korea’s Monolithic System & the Juche Ideology

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s Juche ideology, which was first coined by Kim Il-sung, remains a driving force behind North Korea’s nuclear armament and it is unlikely that it will be phased out. Even though Kim Jong-un committed to denuclearizing the DPRK’s nuclear armament during the Trump-Kim Summit in Singapore in 2018 and Hanoi in 2019, this has not erased the influence of the Juche ideology in North Korean nuclear proliferation ambitions. The Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) Central Military Commission (CMC) meeting which was held on May 23, 2020 cements how Kim Jong-un is rebranding and strategizing the persistence of the ideology as the KWP celebrates its 75^th anniversary. To assume that Pyongyang has forgotten the significance of the Juche ideology for its nuclear armament aspirations would be a fallacy considering that both arguably need each other for existence and survival. For the last 75 years, the Juche has not only been a conduit behind Pyongyang’s political and socio-economic agenda but it has become the raison d’etre for the continuation of the nuclear program as well as the ‘survival’ of the ‘hermit kingdom’ in an international arena they perceive to be a threat to North Korea’s existence. The fact that nonproliferation negotiations with North Korea almost follow a cyclical pattern of failing to garner a denuclearized North Korea shows how the Juche ideology is at the forefront of North Korea’s nuclear program.

Just two months after the 50th anniversary of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Kim Jong-un set forth at the CMC meeting, “New policies for further increasing the nuclear war deterrence of the country and putting the strategic armed forces on a high alert operation in line with the general requirements for the building and development of the armed forces of the country” and “crucial measures for considerably increasing the firepower strike ability of the artillery pieces of the Korean People’s Army.” While this should not come as a shock to North Korea observers and analysts, the questions should be raised on how the global nonproliferation movement should deal with a Juche ideologically influenced Pyongyang that continues to increasingly cement its nuclear prospects. By understanding how the Juche ideology, which is based on ‘self-reliance’, forms the fundamental aspects of the hermit kingdom’s behavior, worldview and philosophy, it becomes simpler for analysts to be aware that as long as the ideology persists, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions will remain in place as a source of subsistence. Thus, policymakers and global leaders need to understand that if they are going to engage North Korea on its nuclear armament, it is vital that the Juche ideology and how it informs Pyongyang policy be understood.

Since the death of Kim Il-sung in July 1994, the Kim family has transformed the Juche ideology to fit the circumstances of the international climate. However, Kim Jong-un in June 2018 was put in a unique standing of becoming the first North Korean leader to meet directly with a US sitting president. Although such a move was historic and unprecedented, it has not driven off course North Korea’s aspirations but has put a spotlight on the regime’s determination to uphold the established policies and ideologies amidst a growing movement for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Just like his father Kim Jong-il and grandfather Kim Il-sung who had followed a Juche ideology grounded in nationalism and military first, Kim Jong-un is continuing to evolve the ‘military first’ viewpoint which involves a progression with nuclear proliferation. This explains why North Korea is showing no signs of disarming anytime soon as evidenced by the May 23rd CMC meeting. It can be argued that Juche’s footprint is embedded in how the Kim family has ruled the DPRK. Kim Jong-un having witnessed how it has worked for regime survival thus far will surely continue to use it to influence his foreign policy goals.

It remains uncertain what the Kim-chaired CMC meeting meant when it said that there would be a nuclear deterrence increase due to a lack of specificity. This could have been deliberately left vague by North Korea as a strategy for propaganda and mind games with the United States and South Korea. Its reclusiveness and isolationism do not only serve as a tactic but have also historically led it in a dangerous game of brinkmanship with the United States. It is important to note that the CMC nuclear discussions came after it emerged that security officials in US President Donald Trump’s administration had discussed holding the first US nuclear test since 1992. North Korea’s tactics of engaging in ‘one-upmanship’ strategies have led to military tension with the United States and with South Korea, especially in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). In his 2002 book titled Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior, Snyder concluded that the emphasis on self-reliance ensures that North Korea does not have to reveal its end game. Thus, the Juche ideology gets imprinted in every utterance that lacks specificities from the DPRK. On the other hand, it should be noted that the meeting came following weeks of speculation on Kim Jong-un’s health, therefore alluding to increasing the nuclear capability could have been meant to deter any foes that might think Pyongyang is at its most vulnerable.

In as much as the ideology advocates for a self-reliant North Korea, the situation on the ground is further from the truth. Seventy-five years since the inception of the Juche ideology, the fact remains that it is more of an aspiration and a propaganda tool. The country has a severe food shortages, a chronic energy crisis, a shrinking GDP, and relies on aid from China, Russia, the United States, and South Korea to name a few. As much as the ideology has proved to be useful for North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, it has not yielded the broad results of attaining self-reliance its founder would have wanted. However, proponents of nonproliferation need to adopt new strategies that are directly suited to address and take seriously the puzzle that is North Korea’s Juche backed foreign policy. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula would not be a bilateral undertaking as was done in Singapore almost two years ago, but it would be a multilateral initiative. Working towards making sure that Pyongyang complies with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and the nuclear moratorium set up by the US against the proliferation and nuclear weapons testing can only be done through joint efforts on a multilateral platform. To avoid falling for North Korea’s use of tactics to avoid reaching an agreement, parties would need to follow a negotiation tactic that focuses on concession for concession. Avoid diverging interests particularly in the US-South Korea alliance and setting a timeline with deadlines that should be followed as a path that would lead to dismantlement and a strict verification protocol that North Korea should adhere with.

As Kim Jong-un continues to use the Juche ideology as a furtherance of the regime’s nuclear policy, it is also important that the United States start to look at how the ideology could be used to address the nuclear issue. To assume that the DPRK would consequently crumble has proven to be a flight of fancy because the nuclear arsenal continues to grow. North Korea marks the last frontier of isolationism in the world today, an understanding of the origins, components, and philosophical underpinnings of the Juche ideology is essential to an understanding of the North Korean state and its people. To be sure, the lessons from history have proven that ideologies are parasitical and not absolute therefore they can be changed.