The Emerging Tehran-Gaza-Doha Axis

Recent developments seem to indicate that Iran is once more Hamas’ primary sponsor. A high-ranking delegation of Hamas leaders from Gaza visited Tehran in October to inform senior leaders in the Iranian capital of the outcome reached from unity government negotiations with West Bank-based Fatah. This visit cemented the reconciliation between Hamas and Iran and accelerated their re-entry into a patron-client relationship that was largely cut off in the last few years. The period also saw Qatar step-up as Hamas’ major funder and perhaps its closest ally in the Arab world. Then-Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani even visited the US-designated terror group in 2012.

“We congratulate you on your refusal to abandon your weapons, an issue that you consider as a red line,” Ali Velayati, the chief foreign policy advisor to the Iranian Supreme Leader told the Hamas visitors. “The Palestinian cause is the most important cause of the Islamic world, and after all this time you remain committed to the principle of resistance against the Zionists despite all the pressure you are facing.” In return, the Hamas officials reiterated that they considered their ties with Tehran “strategic and significant” despite demands they cut off such ties in any reconciliation deal with Fatah. Despite the apparent bond between the two allies, there was also negotiation underway during the trip with Tehran stating that in addition to considering the weapons abandonment issue a “red line for Hamas”, as Velayati said, the Iranians also considered it a red line. Indeed, senior Iranian officials made it abundantly clear to their clients in Gaza that the support would only continue so long as Hamas held onto its weapons.

Just a few short years before, the situation between Hamas and Iran could not have been more different. After decades of sponsoring Hamas, Tehran pulled much of its support from the terror group in 2012 after the Sunnis in Gaza sided with the Syrian rebels at the same time that Iran was backing the Assad government. The quarrel over Damascus’ rightful government led to an unprecedented break between Tehran and the militant group. Despite paying lip service to the cause of Palestinian “resistance”, Iran largely disentangled itself from that arena as it dove into a frantic, and ultimately fruitful, bid to rescue Syria’s government. Over time, it became apparent that Hamas could not lend the Sunni rebels of Syria much besides verbal support, caught as it was in a longstanding struggle of its own.

With Assad back in firm control of Syria and Hamas largely disinterested in the waning conflict, reconciliation between the Gaza Islamists and their longtime Iranian patrons became possible. It could not have come at a better time for Qatar. After a host of Arab nations announced a blockade of Qatar in June, Doha re-built its relationship with Tehran. The drafting of a new charter for the organization, unveiled with much fanfare in Doha, provided a segue into the new relationship. For Hamas, it provided an opportunity to reinvent itself and in doing so distance itself from its poor bet in Syria; a wager that the Qatari elites also made.

Opposing this re-alignment is Egypt, which made its presence felt in Palestinian politics this summer by brokering a landmark reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah that has brought the two rival parties closer to an understanding than at any prior point in the past decade. By hosting the unity talks between the rival Palestinian groups and giving Hamas incentives in the form of border openings and increased trade, Cairo made itself into the leading powerbroker in the fractious politics of the Palestinian territories. As an ally of Saudi Arabia, Sisi’s Egypt has a disdain for the expansionism of the Iranians and hopes to lure Hamas toward a moderate path. The decision by the Palestinian group to end its formal ties to the Muslim Brotherhood was also welcomed in Cairo. All three parties in the Palestinian dispute besides Hamas, namely Fatah, Egypt and Israel, are wary of Iran’s ambitions, and therefore look upon the Tehran-Gaza axis with great concern. Iran has provided reason for such concern, with its call for Hamas to hold onto its weapons and its demand that its client group refuse to yield security control of the Gaza Strip. In essence, it can be argued that Tehran sees Gaza as a potential future Southern Lebanon; another base from which it can continue its battle against Israel through yet another proxy.

For the time being, Hamas’ leadership appears willing to accede to their patron’s demands, however, it remains to be seen whether pressure from Cairo on one side and the West Bank on the other leads to a different outcome in the coming months.

The views expressed here are solely those of the author.