Life After a Nuclear Agreement – Will Bibi Adapt?

Is Israel standing by to recalibrate its policy vis-à-vis Iran? The CIP’s Navid Hassibi delves into the subject in this piece on Iran-Israeli relations. 

Source: Office of the Speaker John Boehner/Flickr

[comment/analysis] The month of March was both a success for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as well as being a rude awakening. His election victory came at a potentially high cost; culminating with the Obama administration’s stated intent to reassess US policy toward Israel. It all began with his highly controversial address to a joint session of Congress where he unequivocally rejected what he termed a “bad deal” with Iran. While doing so however, he seemingly offered a subtle glimmer of hope that his government would accept a nuclear deal by stating that if the United States is determined to proceed with an agreement, it should insist that it not terminate until Iran has abandoned its aggression in the region, halted its terrorism and accepted Israel’s existence. Knowing that momentum has grown in reaching a deal, was the Israeli Prime Minister’s statement a deliberate and coded message to Tehran that Tel Aviv is open not only to a nuclear agreement but to a reassessment of mutual hostilities, or in other words – a “truce” with Iran? While this may be far-fetched and sound contrary to Netanyahu’s frequent rhetoric opposing a deal, it could be reflective of the strategic realities that Israel must adapt to in the event a nuclear deal is reached between the so-called P5+1 and Iran. Failure to do so will risk Israel to be an outlier of a post-nuclear agreement global environment.

Three conditions were ostensibly outlined by Netanyahu, the first being that “Iran abandon its aggression in the region”. Since its founding in 1982, the resistance group Hezbollah, a US designated terrorist organization which has been however omitted from the latest US World Threat Assessment, has received vital material, military, financial and political support from Iran. Traditionally an Israeli arch nemesis, Hezbollah has shifted its primary focus to the broader war against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) for the time being. What the Israeli-Hezbollah skirmish in January highlights however is that deeply rooted animosity and distrust between these two continues to exist. In this respect, Tel Aviv still perceives Hezbollah as a major national security concern and one with which Tehran wields a significant amount of influence.

The second condition seemingly outlined was that Iran “halts its support for terrorism”. Indeed, Iran’s ties in the Levant expand beyond Hezbollah and include other US designated terrorist groups such as Hamas, which Netanyahu characterizes as being arguably one and the same with ISIL. In point of fact, Iranian-Hamas relations have been concerning for the Israeli government, not the least due to Iran’s provision of military assistance and funds to the Palestinian group. In fact, a primary weapon of the group is the Fajr-5 missile, whose technology has been supplied by Iran and is now being produced locally. Given that major conflict erupts between Israel and Hamas every two years on average, it would be in Tel Aviv’s interest to starve Hamas of any support from Iran. While Iranian support for the group had waned due to Hamas’ opposition to the Assad regime in Syria, there are indications of a rapprochement between the two (and Hezbollah) as of late.

The third condition itemized by Netanyahu was Iran’s recognition of the State of Israel with which it cut off all official ties in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic revolution. Though Iran and Israel are now bitter enemies, the tension between them is relatively recent and stems from a split in geostrategic interests between Tehran and Tel Aviv in the early 1990s. In the first decade or so of the Islamic Republic, there was mutually beneficial cooperation in response to common threats such as the Soviet Union, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and pan-Arabism. Israel provided material support to Iran during the war with Iraq in the 1980s, not least through the Iran-Contra affair.

In its 2003 “grand bargain” proposal to the United States, Iran offered concessions that would address Netanyahu’s conditions. Among these proposals was Tehran’s offer to stop any material support to Palestinian groups, including Hamas, and to pressure these organizations to stop violent action against civilians within the borders of 1967; to nudge Hezbollah into solely being a political entity; and to support a two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, thereby de facto recognizing the State of Israel.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif were closely linked with the so-called “grand bargain”. That they are at the helm of Iran’s diplomatic renaissance could present unique opportunities for historic openings, as the nuclear negotiations have clearly demonstrated. To be sure, circumstances have changed in the region since 2003. Iran’s growth as a regional power in the last decade does not incentivize it to pursue a grand bargain. There also seems to be a lack of appetite for grand bargaining in the United States according to reports. That does not necessarily negate the 2003 proposals from becoming a reality over time, particularly if a nuclear deal is reached. A nuclear deal could very well enable the United States and Iran to cooperate openly on overlapping interests and could by association calm Israeli-Iranian tensions as time passes as a result of US interlocution. Compounded by geopolitical realities in the region, including the rise of extremism, sectarian strife and Iranian-Saudi tensions, there is less strategic rationale for continued Israeli-Iranian animosity. In every practical sense, a nuclear deal with Iran should satisfy Israeli concerns over Iran’s nuclear program. Within this context, the time is ripe for Iran and Israel to consider suspending hostilities.

Recent history reveals that both Tel Aviv and Tehran have flirted with this idea. Although Netanyahu has been vociferous in addressing the perceived Iranian threat to Israel, during his first term as prime minister in the late 1990s, he purportedly sent signals that he was interested in dialogue with Tehran. The same is true in Iran’s case. Last year, Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif expressed that if the Palestinian-Israeli issue were to be resolved, Iran would consider recognizing Israel. Clearly, both sides have been willing at one point or another to look beyond their political differences and let their national interests guide them to deal together on shared regional concerns. Given that the two have cooperated in the past, it cannot be invalidated that they can do so in the future.

As a nuclear deal inches closer and perhaps as part of an effort to rehabilitate strained ties with the Obama administration, Netanyahu is abandoning its zero enrichment policy for Iran and is now acceding to Iran retaining some enrichment capacity. While this change of heart is unlikely to be an effort to pursue a “truce” with Tehran, it could be the latest sign that Israel is recalibrating its policy in anticipation of a nuclear agreement.