As deadline looms, who has a tougher road ahead, President Obama or Rouhani?

Navid Hassibi provides an overview of those working to derail nuclear talks in both Washington, DC and Tehran.

Picture by World Economic Forum – Flickr

[comment/analysis] As the March deadline for a political framework to end the nuclear deadlock with Iran looms, hardliners in both Washington and Tehran are working in earnest to derail efforts at peacefully resolving the 13 year dispute.  To be sure, Presidents Obama and Rouhani face stiff opposition at home that they must navigate through en-route to seizing a potentially historic breakthrough.  Below is a brief overview of who these hardliners are as well as a look at the road ahead for Presidents Obama and Rouhani.

In DC

It comes as no surprise that the Obama administration faces stiff opposition from congressional hawks, consisting largely of Republicans but also a noticeable number of Democrats, much to the dismay of the president.  Senate hawks have repeatedly threatened to implicitly sabotage the negotiation process with Iran since the November 2013 interim agreement was signed by working to pass additional sanctions.  Last summer, Senate Republicans Bob Corker, Lindsey Graham, John McCain and Marco Rubio introduced the Iran Nuclear Negotiations Act of 2014 that would have required the White House to submit any agreement for Senate review.  Also last summer, Senators Marco Rubio and Mark Kirk tabled the Iran Human Rights Accountability Act of 2014 into the Senate, which would have imposed additional sanctions on Iran, among other things.  Since taking control of the Senate in January, Republican Senators Lindsey Graham and Bob Corker have been working to revive legislation requiring Senate approval of any nuclear pact.

As noted, a number of Senate Democrats have also been complicit in obstructing negotiations with Iran.  Robert Menendez, former Democratic Chairman and now Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has been vociferous in his support for additional sanctions.  Just recently, Menendez co-sponsored, along with Republican Senator Mark Kirk, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act of 2015 which would automatically impose sanctions on Iran if negotiations with the so-called P5+1 fail to yield an agreement by June 30, 2015.  This bill allegedly enjoys support from other Democrats such as Senator Richard Blumenthal.  Consequently, President Obama has threatened to veto any sanctions legislation, arguing that imposing new sanctions could derail ongoing talks.  Senate Republicans would need at least 13 Democratic Senators to override the presidential veto.  Menendez and several other Democrats have since signaled willingness to wait until late March, the first deadline to reach a political framework agreement with Iran, before throwing their support behind Republican sanctions efforts.

Akin to their Senate counterparts, House Republicans have been active in opposing the Obama administration’s Iran policy, not the least evidenced through House Speaker John Boehner’s controversial invitation to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to address a joint session of Congress on March 3^rd.  According to the White House, Boehner did not consult with them or the State Department about the invitation, which is seemingly against protocol.  Needless to say, the Administration is said to be infuriated at what seems to be efforts on the part of Boehner and Netanyahu to derail negotiations with Iran.  Much to the chagrin of the Israeli Prime Minister, Secretary of State John Kerry will be meeting with his Iranian counterpart the day of Netanyahu’s address.

Influential voices within the Beltway opposing the Iran talks are not restricted to Capitol Hill.  Notable interest groups such as AIPAC, the MEK, and likeminded think tanks and organizations are expending much financial and political capital to influence decision-makers and the broader public alike against a nuclear deal.  For its part, AIPAC has steadfastly promoted the imposition of additional sanctions against Iran and regularly lobbies lawmakers to that end.  AIPAC is seemingly urging legislators to attend Netanyahu’s congressional address next month.  While some Democratic lawmakers have announced plans not to attend the speech, whether their colleagues attend may reportedly depend on AIPAC as several dozen Democrats in the House and at least 14 Senators, including the party’s leadership, have already announced their plans to attend.  Evidently, these congressional members are all major recipients of funding by “pro-Israel PACs” who are largely influenced by AIPAC.

In Tehran

The Iranian domestic political arena has its fair share of complexities that threaten to derail nuclear negotiations as well.  Iran’s hardliners, who hail from various institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards (or IRGC), parliament, the judiciary, the intelligence apparatus, the clerical establishment and conservative media, are all skeptical of negotiations as they view the West, particularly the United States, as being untrustworthy.  They believe the November 2013 interim agreement as being contrary to Iranian national interests since in their view, Tehran received little in exchange for the many concessions that it made.  As noted by others, these hardliners disagree with the West ideologically and continue to oppose the United States as it forms a part of their identity.  They have also reaped in the benefits of the political and economic sanctions regime imposed on Iran over the years.  Sanctions removal and any form of rapprochement with the United States as a result of a nuclear deal would economically and politically marginalize the beneficiaries of Western-Iranian tensions.

Unsurprisingly, one of these hardline groups is the IRGC which has increased its political and economic weight during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  Reportedly, the IRGC was awarded at least 11,000 development projects, ranging from construction and aerospace to oil and gas between 2006 and 2013.  Since President Rouhani assumed office in 2013, the IRGC has challenged his foreign policy, including the nuclear talks.  This is partly attributable to the Rouhani administration’s efforts at reducing the IRGC’s clout in foreign policy and stake in the Iranian economy.  In response, the IRGC is frequently and indirectly (so as to provide a semblance of unity) critical of the Administration as well as its negotiating strategy with the so-called P5+1.  This has yet to derail Rouhani’s efforts as his team has thus far enjoyed political latitude thanks to the conditional support of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  Indeed, hardliners are bothered at the notion of losing influence with the Supreme Leader who has echoed Rouhani’s position that the IRGC must reduce its footprint in the political arena.  The IRGC’s riposte has been that the main threat to the revolution is in politics and that they could not remain silent in that regard.  As a result, Rouhani has publicly, and indirectly, lambasted the IRGC on several occasions.  Late last year, in a speech on anti-corruption, Rouhani stated that “We have to eliminate the consolidation of power.  … If the guns, the money, the newspapers… are gathered in one place, there will be corruption.”

Another group of hardliners consists of some members of Iran’s parliament, or the Majles, which have been quite vocal in opposing Rouhani’s negotiating strategy and the Administration’s engagement with the United States via the Kerry-Zarif bilats.  This was recently exemplified in the aftermath of Foreign Minister Zarif’s walk with Secretary Kerry in Geneva when conservative Majles members reacted angrily by signing a petition to summon Zarif to explain himself.  The petition read: “Your exhibitionist walk together with Kerry was certainly outside the norms of diplomacy, so why don’t’ you put a stop to such behavior?”  These sentiments were echoed within the clerical establishment, some of whom also take a hard stance against Rouhani’s policies.  During Friday prayer shortly after the Kerry-Zarif stroll, the hardline cleric Kazem Sadeghi referred to the walk as being “against the dignity of the Islamic Republic’s diplomacy”.  Back to Majles members however, the more hawkish figures there are comparable in rhetoric to their hawkish counterparts in Congress in many respects, often voicing their disagreement with the Administration’s approach to negotiations and feeling left out in the process.  Last spring, some members of the Majles held a conference at the former US Embassy in Tehran, where they argued that the negotiators were selling out Iran’s interests by giving away too much too soon, as described by others.  These Majles members proposed that any final agreement be subject to approval by Iran’s parliament, which is something not dissimilar from what is being debated stateside on Capitol Hill.

Hardline elements within the media are also rather aggressively outspoken against a nuclear deal and Rouhani’s policies, as exemplified by newspapers such as the ultra-conservative newspaper Kayhan.  Moreover, by routinely failing to uphold human rights in Iran, the Judiciary expends much energy at sabotaging Rouhani’s efforts at negotiating a nuclear deal and rebranding Iran in the eyes of the world.

The road ahead

While both presidents face stiff opposition at home, they both have a limited political window to act before giving the hardline elements in their country the advantage.  In the United States, President Obama has successfully pushed back against congressional action to impose additional sanctions.  He will not be able to push back indefinitely, however and has ensured hawks that he will pursue further sanctions in talks fail.  In Iran, President Rouhani has sidelined hardliners for the time being in large part due to the support given to him by Supreme Leader Khamenei.  This support is not unconditional and should an agreement fail to come to fruition, Rouhani could become a lame duck president.

That being said, reaching a political framework agreement by late March and a comprehensive agreement by June will be critical in ensuring the rightful place of hardliners – on the sidelines.